Mitä on tiedediplomatia?

Ilmastonmuutos, energia, avaruushankkeet, turvallisuus, globaali terveys, luonnonvarojen suojelu… Monissa kunnianhimoisissa hankkeissa, kuten suurissa energiahankkeissa ja vaikka avaruustutkimuksessa tarvittavat resurssit ovat niin suuria, ettei mikään valtio voi toteuttaa niitä yksin. Yhteistyö myös mahdollistaa osaamisen ja riskien jakamisen.

Tiedediplomatia on ollut erityisen vahvaa Yhdysvalloissa ja Iso-Britanniassa, mutta se on tärkeää myös pienemmille valtioille. Kuten Uuden-Seelannin pääministerin tiedeneuvonantaja Peter Gluckman on todennut:

”Pienenä valtiona meidän täytyy kilpailla pysyäksemme relevantteina maailmassa, jossa meidät voidaan helposti unohtaa. Meidän täytyy osoittaa, että pienet maat voivat todella olla merkittäviä.”

The small advanced nations are typified by Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, and the Nordic countries. They have shown flexibility and nimbleness in restructuring their economies and their broader policy settings in comparison to the pace of change in many of the larger nations. Their smaller size allows them to engage relatively directly with stakeholders, including the public, and thereby they can be more agile. Furthermore, because their economies are small, they are more alert to—and able to engage more fully in—international trends and opportunities. Such countries are generally typified by well-developed science and innovation systems and, in a scientific sense, their contributions are disproportionately large compared to their small size. In addition, because of the lack of inertia, many have become early adopters of emerging technologies. They have thus become pilots for change and technological innovation on one hand and, on the other, exemplars for both larger nations and developing nations in how to use science and technology for economic advancement and therefore social advancement.

These advancements are critical, as there is an emerging cohort of common scientific and technologically based issues that countries in general face. These include climate change, synthetic biology, water recycling, and biosecurity. Solutions to these concerns, and related requirements of technology assessment and regulation, go beyond national boundaries because these problems and opportunities often have cross-jurisdictional impacts. In this context, the smaller nations are no less concerned than the larger nations.

Although the combined economic output of the twenty or so small industrialized nations with a population of less than 20 million exceeds that of China (1.3 billion people), they are afforded little weight in international forums. At G20 meetings, their perspectives are incorporated only if they are members of the European Union. Moreover, at the arguably most significant forum of science policy makers and strategists, the Carnegie Group, small nations are not specifically represented except via their EU involvement. The national interests of the small advanced economies require that they give significant effort to projecting their capacities and capabilities alongside those of the larger nations. This paper reflects on the challenges of science and diplomacy from the perspective of one of these small countries, New Zealand.

New Zealand has a population of about 4.5 million. Over the last thirty years, it has expanded its focus from exporting food primarily to Europe to also being deeply engaged in exporting food to Asia. New Zealand’s economy, while diversifying, remains very much based on the export of high quality and safe food products. This is accompanied by heavy investment in agricultural and food sciences and a commitment to related areas, such as biosecurity science and food safety science. In addition, services exports, particularly in education and engineering, are growing parts of the economy. In the last decade there has also been the rapid emergence of the knowledge economy in areas ranging from digitally based filmmaking to pharmaceuticals. These higher-value technology-based products are the most rapidly growing part of the export sector.

Despite New Zealand’s challenges of size and distance, it has played a significant role in world affairs. One example has been through leadership in agricultural trade negotiations. Nearly two decades ago, New Zealand removed all agricultural subsidies and has been a strident negotiator for the removal of artificial barriers that limit agricultural access. Indeed it has been at the forefront of free trade agreements—it was the first western country to have a free trade agreement with China. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, a free trade agreement initially between New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei, is now at the core of a hoped-for major Pacific Rim free trade agreement.

Recently, New Zealand has started to reconstruct its science and innovation system and is paying considerable attention to defining the intervention logic for State investment in research. In contrast to larger economies, when small countries shift from commodity to higher-value exports, they often lack the capital markets to rapidly develop innovation as well as the skill sets required for marketing technology, as opposed to other commodities. Any success depends on early internationalization of the country’s science, through both the public and private sectors. Therefore, there is a need to identify synergistic relationships with foreign partners who can address some of the domestic deficiencies; thus mutually advantageous international partnerships can be created and, as such, they cannot be separated from the broader diplomatic agenda.

As a small country, New Zealand faces the fundamental problem of knowing that it cannot have the capabilities or capacities to undertake all domains of research in depth and the challenges of where to apply limited funds. One tension concerns the balance between research where the primary outcome is enhanced economic growth and research for other possible public-good outcomes. These other outcomes are very important—they range from those of a defensive nature (e.g., ensuring agricultural biosecurity) to enhancing social sciences to allow the Government to address the complex issues associated with being a young multicultural society. Promotion of public understanding of risk is an urgent requirement, as there is an inevitable and understandable tension between the demand for greater resources extraction and the desire to limit environmental damage. Similar to other countries, but perhaps somewhat more intensively, New Zealand is very conscious of its role as an environmental guardian, with environmental issues being reflected in intense public and political discourse and strong regulations.

In an attempt to give greater weight to the role of science in areas, including international relations, beyond policy relating to the support and funding of science, the position of Chief Science Advisor (CSA) to the Prime Minister was created in 2009. This was followed by the formation of an International Science and Innovation Coordination Committee (ISICC), which is now co-chaired by the CSA and the head of the Ministry of Science and Innovation (MSI). ISICC brings together the heads of the relevant agencies, including Foreign Affairs and Trade, to maximize the diplomatic and trade advantages associated with science and, conversely, to explore how diplomatic interests can assist the science and science-based innovation community. It is clear that there is considerable interplay and overlap between the three major types of interaction—namely science for diplomacy, science in diplomacy, and diplomacy for science—and that these take on a particular flavor in a small country such as New Zealand.

As New Zealand explores closer relationships with a number of nations, small and large, its disproportionate scientific output in certain key areas, such as agricultural, biosecurity, and biomedical science, helps build close and meaningful relationships more rapidly than otherwise would be achieved. Further, science diplomacy broadens the relationship beyond simple economic considerations. This is particularly evident when staff or students are exchanged, resulting in closer cultural understandings. Again, this is important to small countries that have real limitations in their capacity to project their identity. New Zealand has already witnessed the advantages of science diplomacy in international dealings, as the following cases will demonstrate.

In the 1980s, New Zealand introduced a total ban on nuclear power and nuclear weapons, which led to tension with the United States. The policy effectively precluded visits of the U.S. Navy, with nuclear-powered vessels in its fleet, and in turn led to suspension of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) security treaty as far as New Zealand is concerned. Two decades of some uncertainty in the relationship followed, when the word “ally” was studiously avoided in describing the U.S.-New Zealand relationship. Only in the last three years has real equanimity been restored, although New Zealand had previously committed troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan.

What is notable, however, is that during this time of relative distancing, science was used as a very effective diplomatic tool. Joint U.S.-New Zealand activities in support of Antarctic scientific operations continued on an amicable basis while differences elsewhere were being worked through. The main point of entry to the U.S. Antarctic activities is via McMurdo Station, which is only three kilometers from New Zealand’s Scott Base. Both bases are supported by a joint logistics facility located in Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city. This was home to U.S. military personnel supporting the Antarctic mission throughout the two decades. The science activities always remained well coordinated, and both countries worked closely throughout to protect the spirit of the Antarctic treaty and create a solid basis for rebuilding trust.

Because small nations have a differing geopolitical status, they can be catalysts for important multi-jurisdictional research and technological initiatives. The Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases (GRA) was a New Zealand initiative that was announced in relationship to the 2009 UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen. It is now a formal alliance of thirty-three countries, including all the large economies and food producers, with the secretariat based in New Zealand. Its mission is very specific—to focus on research, development, and the extension of technologies and practices that will help deliver ways to grow more food (and more climate-resilient food systems) without growing greenhouse gas emissions. Globally these emissions are similar in volume to those from transport, and in developing countries they may make up more than 50 percent of emissions. New Zealand, because of its high dependence on agriculture on one hand and its non-transport energy supplies being already primarily renewable on the other, has a similar profile.

The GRA initially undertook a stock-take of relevant research under several headings with working parties chaired by different countries and is now encouraging coordinated research. The areas in which effort is focused are greenhouse gas production associated with paddy rice cultivation (co-chaired by Japan and Uruguay), with livestock farming (co-chaired by the Netherlands and New Zealand), and with croplands (co-chaired by the United States and Brazil) and two cross-cutting groups focused on soil carbon and nitrogen cycling and inventories and measurement, respectively. To accelerate progress, the New Zealand government provided funds to the GRA for it to issue Grand Challenges to support research in strategic areas to reduce emissions associated with pastoral farming in temperate conditions. In turn, this has encouraged some highly innovative transnational partnerships.

New Zealand’s role demonstrated that small nation leadership can promote international research. It shows how New Zealand can create sustained research projects of value to the developing world and how international research can, in turn, assist New Zealand.

Ninety percent of New Zealand’s primary industry products are exported and, as mentioned above, there is an absolute commitment to free trade in agriculture. At the same time, the country must maintain the very highest levels of biosecurity for imported products. For example, a foot and mouth epidemic would destroy a core component of the economy, and recently there has been an incursion of a bacterium that has devastated part of the important kiwifruit export industry.

New Zealand’s high level of vigilance to protect its borders is not only about keeping out agricultural threats; there is also a need to protect the country’s unique flora and fauna, which have evolved after eighty million years of geographical isolation. Such an obligation has been codified via New Zealand’s signing of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. It is recognized that 40 percent of the endemic bird species have become extinct since the arrival of humans eight hundred years ago.

Thus there is an inherent conflict between unhindered trade and biosecurity compliance requirements that requires good use of science to resolve. Domestically and internationally, serious arguments occur about biosecurity being wrongly, ineptly, or cynically applied, often along with thinly veiled accusations of nontariff barriers. Even in a relationship as close as that between Australia and New Zealand, local politics and trade protectionism can converge to influence outcomes. The export of apples to Australia had been effectively blocked on the basis of a biosecurity argument for some eighty years and was only recently resolved in New Zealand’s favor at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Conversely, New Zealand is debating restrictions on the importation of some pig products and honey on the basis of possible biosecurity risks. The process of resolution is complex in dissecting out science from vested interests and biosecurity restrictions from protectionism, and has to be resolved using agreed-upon scientific and technical guidelines as negotiated in international agreements.

New Zealand has worked hard to ensure that science and science-based interpretation are central to international biosecurity conventions associated with international trading arrangements. For example, in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (known as the SPS Agreement), countries agree to ensure that any SPS measures are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and are not maintained without scientific evidence. For New Zealand, its trade-based diplomacy is thus deeply rooted in the country’s science.

As a small nation, New Zealand has a limited capacity to have diplomatic representation in countries beyond our trading partners. Certainly New Zealand has particular obligations to the small island states of the Pacific. Such countries have a common set of issues where science is important, including the provision of sustainable energy, maintaining management of fish stocks, responding to natural disasters, protecting biodiversity, addressing rising sea levels, and coping with high levels of noncommunicable disease. Donor nations increasingly need to work collectively to assist these small states. A further challenge for New Zealand and other donor countries is how to best help these nations—which have limited capacities to absorb and use technologies—to achieve greater robustness in a technological age, which is central to their future viability.

Beyond these Pacific states, a recent survey has shown that where New Zealand does not have significant trade exchange, the most intensive interactions are based on science. In a survey of our academic and research institutions, more than fifty of the less developed countries were identified where there are active research interactions involving New Zealand scientists. In none of those countries did we have resident diplomatic staff, making science perhaps the most visible part of New Zealand’s profile. This suggests that science is indeed a very important component of maintaining a global profile for small countries.

This paper has demonstrated that for a country such as New Zealand, the interplay between science and diplomacy has a different focus from that of larger nations, and in some ways it is even more important in projecting a small nation’s profile. With limited domestic resources, science frequently has an international dimension. Exploring opportunities to work jointly with other nations is a necessary part of building capabilities and relationships. In this respect, the lack of an effective and inclusive global science forum is limiting. As science becomes more global in its presentation, it is vital that small advanced nations are integrated into the processes that link science to innovation, economic growth, and environmental protection. Indeed, it is argued that small nations can play a disproportionately valuable role.

Diplomacy, Miliband observed, has long been premised on the idea of a ’balance of power’. It was a world in which the international system ”tended toward equilibrium and self-correction as states sought to balance each other’s economic and military strengths” in ways that followed the principles that framed Newtonian mechanics.

In contrast, ”a defining feature of our world today is the tendency toward uncertainty”, mirroring the world of quantum mechanics. Miliband pointed to the complex feedbacks that are driving climate change and the asymmetric tactics of terrorist organizations. Both are fuelling chronic uncertainty and instability across the global in dramatically different ways.

In contrast to the world of diplomacy in the 19th and 20th centuries, which was dominated by nation-states, Miliband noted that international relations today involve many players, including nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations , the media and social networks, all of which ”constrain and shape the preferences and actions of states”. He suggested that this shift was akin ”to the move from Newtonian mechanics, predicated on globes in orbit around each other, to the world of quantum mechanics that sees a more subtle and complex interplay of different forces.”

This led Miliband to cite another emerging feature of international relations in the 21st century: interdependence. This, he said, resembles the ”shift in Newtonian science, modelled on discrete independent systems, to quantum mechanics that accepts that everything is interconnected.”

At a time of dramatic change, Miliband maintained that the world of international relations needs the world of science to help it address the most critical issues that we face.

”Scientific progress”, he contended, ”can achieve breakthroughs that diplomacy cannot match”, whether the issue is commercially viable carbon capture and storage systems to mitigate climate change, or the genetic improvement of crops to alleviate the spectre of hunger and poverty.

Science, he also observed, ”can help forge consensus where there is political division.” He cited the historic role of science in helping to create the verification regimes that made nuclear arms agreements possible during the Cold War, and the building of CERN in the 1950s that helped to build bridges among European nations following World War II. Miliband suggested that science could help ”break down barriers of the 21st century, particularly those between Western and Muslim-majority countries.”

In addition, Miliband noted that science has the power to ”shift debates and catalyse political action.” Such shifts, he noted, will be needed if we are to successfully address global environmental issues like climate change and biodiversity loss. In particular, scientific collaboration will be essential to better understand the risks and solutions related to the coming age of resource scarcity. ”Mobilizing action and preventing new tensions from arising” will depend in part on these efforts.

But having science support diplomacy is only one side of the equation, according to Miliband. On the other side of the equation, diplomacy can – and should – support science. This is true in the financing of large scientific projects that are too expensive for any one nation to fund. For example, the Human Genome Project, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Large Hadron Collider represent large-scale, multi-billion projects that require international collaboration and financing. On a smaller scale, diplomacy also plays a crucial role in the exchange of scientists and the profusion of ideas through visa regulations and intellectual property rights agreements.

All of this means that ”politics and science need to come closer together – not for politics to smother science, but instead to be informed by its potential.”

By Norman Neureiter

Science Diplomacy Around the World

I didn’t plan a trip around the world. It just turned out that way. But let me start from the beginning. In previous pieces for Bridges, I have written a lot about science diplomacy. The Japanese science community has, for several years, been very interested in the interaction of scientific research and foreign policy – the key elements of science diplomacy. Very recently the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to this interest with the important decision to create inside the Ministry an office of science diplomacy – thus officially making science and science cooperation a recognized aspect of Japanese foreign policy. This decision came at a most propitious time.

For the past two years, Dr. Vaughan Turekian, the director of the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy, has convened an international meeting named, in a highly flattering gesture to me, the Annual Neureiter Science Diplomacy Roundtable. The first one was in Washington, the second was held at The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS) in Trieste, Italy, and Japan organized the third on November 10-11 in Tokyo. The host institution was the National Graduate (Research) Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) – a small, unique university with a large percentage of foreign students. The key drivers of the Roundtable were Dr. Tateo Arimoto, director of the Innovation, Science and Technology Policy Program at GRIPS and his deputy and advisor to the GRIPS president, Atsushi Sunami. Also represented from Japan were the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT); the Hitachi Corporation; the Japan Science and technology Agency (JST); the Bureau of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy in the Cabinet Office; the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; the International Science Cooperation Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and, very interestingly, the Korean Scientists Association of Japan.

Southeast Asia was represented by Dr. Lukman Hakim, former chairman of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and Paul Harris, a visiting fellow at the Public Policy School at the Australia National University. From Korea came Dr. Dong-Pil Min, emeritus professor at Seoul University, and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board to the UN Secretary General. Dr. Valentin I. Sergienko, chairman of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FEBRAS), represented Russian science. Additional participants were Romain Murenzi, executive director of the World Academy of Sciences (TWAS); Alan Leshner, the CEO of AAAS; and Peter Tindemans, the secretary general of Euroscience.

The meeting consisted of three sessions, one on ASEAN, one on Korea – both North and South – and one on Russia. It was very clear that there is considerable opportunity for more science cooperation with the ASEAN countries and Japan and South Korea.

While we were in Japan, there was a ten-person delegation from Japan in North Korea attempting to follow-up Prime Minister Abe’s offer of more cooperation (including in science) with North Korea. The condition was that more information had to be provided to Japan regarding people abducted from Japan by the North Koreans. At that point little, if any, new information had been provided and any improved relationship between North Korea and Japan remained elusive.

Were this to change, there would likely be considerable potential for science diplomacy with North Korea across a number of areas. It also appeared that cooperation even with South Korea was limited – perhaps reflecting the presently quite strained political relations between the two countries. There are some three million Koreans in Japan, and their loyalty has tended to be toward North Korea (DPRK). However, the behavior of the DPRK in threatening Japan and the financial sanctions against the DPRK have resulted in greatly curtailed financial aid coming from Japan, and cancellation of the ship connections that formerly existed.

There is currently still a desire of the Abe government in Japan to ease the restrictions with the DPRK, provided that more information on the abductees can be obtained. To date, however, there has been little progress.

I predict that science diplomacy initiatives by Japan can expand throughout the world – especially in the ASEAN region. It will be very interesting to see if there is some easing of tensions between Japan and North Korea and what science initiatives might be successful there. But it is far from certain that the abductee issue will be clarified to a level that will permit the Japanese Government to undertake a serious cooperative initiative toward North Korea.

I was also particularly interested in the vast range of activities described by Dr. Sergienko in the Russian Academy of Sciences in Vladivostok. He was expansive in describing the work at the Academy and seemed to welcome visits and possible cooperation. He extended an invitation and it is one that I would like to find time to accept in the not too distant future.

While preparing for the trip to Japan, it also became apparent that a long-delayed meeting of the board of the Indo-US Science and Technology Forum was going to take place on November 15, 2014. Though I had stepped down from the US co-chair position after 12 years, I still remained on the board. Furthermore, for the last 3-4 years the US staff support for the Forum had also been located at AAAS. So this Board meeting, at which there were a number of important issues to resolve, was very important for AAAS and my attendance was imperative. In addition, the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Indian National Science Academy (INSA) had finally agreed to hold a joint workshop in Delhi on the subject of Challenges of Emerging Infections and Global Health Safety. The dates were November 18-20, 2014 and I had been asked to be a member of the US delegation to that meeting as well.

I found out that one cannot fly non-stop from Tokyo to Delhi; one stop is essential and one of the most convenient is Seoul, the capital of South Korea. By coincidence, I had two reasons to stop in Seoul – one was to try to visit the Seoul office of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST). This remarkable 600-student university in Pyongyang, North Korea, was built by its current president, President James (Chin Kyung) Kim. The Korean-American president coordinated the university with volunteer teachers, making English the only language of instruction, and relied on funds raised from contributions from around the world. It is remarkable that such an institution exists. It was officially dedicated in September 2010 with attendance growing in recent years to 600 – a mixture of graduate and undergraduate students.

I sent out emails, and when I arrived in Seoul and contacted the PUST office run by Dr. Kim’s son, Sam, I was told that his father had seen my email and was flying in to Seoul that afternoon and we could have dinner together that evening. That evening I got an update on the school’s progress, learning about the challenge western financial sanctions are creating for the funding of PUST operations, as well as the continuous expansion of the school. I was also told that some 14 North Korean students have already been able to attend a British University for up to one year. Donors have been found in the UK to make a limited number of such scholarships possible.

By the time I realized that I was circling the world halfway, I thought about going all the way around. I vaguely remembered the existence of an “around-the-world ticket” with a special fare. Not all airlines sell them – they are sold by Star Alliance, which is its own legal entity headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, and handled by Lufthansa. A business class round-the-world ticket can actually cost less than a single round trip ticket from Washington to Tokyo or even to Delhi. One has to make at least four stops, with the flexibility of changing flights or adding cities at will with little additional cost as long as one continues going in the same direction.

That ticket provided another opportunity. Leaving late at night (actually at 3:30 a.m., the next day), I arrived in Frankfurt eight hours later and started a weekend there in which I joined a German friend in Heidelberg and traveled over the weekend to Strasbourg, France. There I pursued some history of the University of Strasbourg during the period of Nazi occupation during World War II.

Monday morning I took a shuttle bus to Frankfurt and then headed off to Vienna (no additional charge) to visit IIASA, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, where I attended a session on possible research opportunities for IIASA in the Arctic and checked on my role as chairman of the IIASA endowment fund. IIASA’s Dr. Margaret Collins, on their Council for External Relations, and I made arrangements for flying to Brussels the next morning (again with no charge added to my ticket) to meet with the European Foundation Center – an institution with many European foundations as members. My goal was to gain a greater understanding of the nature and vitality of philanthropy in Europe. This was especially relevant as it might be a source of support to IIASA for research on the great problems of mankind such as energy, climate change, land use, poverty, and equity: Such are the substantive work arenas for IIASA. After one night in Brussels, I proceeded to take a flight to Boston, where my family met me for a Thanksgiving weekend. A short flight on Monday to Washington finally completed my first-ever trip around the world.